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Abstract 
Universities have, for a long time, gained societal recognition and interest 
through their ability to govern a global system of open science and open 
exchange as well as a system for building of recognition capital, for 
researchers and students. Universities are increasingly becoming 
commercial actors, particularly in terms of performing licensing activities 
and investing in ventures. As universities take on new roles and develop 
new practices for commodifying new knowledge into licenses or new 
ventures, questions arise about the future role and idea of universities as 
such, as well as around the actual practical and managerial consequences. 
However, if universities are to walk down paths of commodification at all 
– and strong “defacto” arguments for this can be made today – there is 
reason to search for a “new intellectual infrastructure” of universities, in 
which the commercial roles and practices of universities can converge and 
make sense in the knowledge economy. While providing two significantly 
different case illustrations – Columbia University in New York and 
Chalmers School of Entrepreneurship in Sweden – with some converging 
trends, the paper conceptualizes elements of a new university 
infrastructure both in terms of the role played and norms applied, as well 
as in terms of an object-oriented process for commodifying inventions into 
intellectual property (IP). 
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Introduction 
This paper concerns the way in which universities can provide a new intellectual 
infrastructure for knowledge utilization and commercialization. The concept of 
infrastructure is normally associated with roads, rail and other public (physical) goods in 
society upon which an industrial economy and society can be built. Many would agree 
that the notion of infrastructure can also include intellectual elements, such as common 
norms and roles needed for a complex society to work. Many would also see institutions 
of higher education and research – here lumped together under the name universities – as 
key providers of such infrastructure, by educating people into important professions and 
roles in the political, economical and cultural spheres of society as well as contributing 
with scientific knowledge to our culture and economy.  
 
However, while it is obvious for us that infrastructure in terms of roads, professions, etc. 
should help us move “from point A to point B” (whether physically or intellectually), this 
is not yet the case regarding processes of commodifying university research into 
intellectual property (IP) and economic wealth. Probably the most dominant perspective  
on the university’s role in the surrounding society points at a boundary that is seemingly 
difficult to transcend (see Figure 1). According to this view, the university, on one side, 
through open exchange and open science is supposed to discover breakthrough 
innovations, and the surrounding economy, on the other side – somehow – is supposed to 
“pick up” the innovation and generate economic wealth. In fact, the boundary between a 
world of open exchange, in which the capital is what we, primarily, choose to call 
recognition capital, and a world of market exchange, where the capital is financial, is 
often called the “valley of death”, a perhaps dramatic metaphor pointing at the need for a 
new infrastructure. 
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Figure 1. The strong image of a barrier between the university and the surrounding 
society as regards the commercializing of new knowledge can partly be explained by 
different institutional roles. 
 
Many attempts to transcend the barrier have been made by universities and national 
policies. The most famous examples, such as MIT and Stanford, are today embedded in 
innovative cultures consisting of informally networked people (often former students) 
bridging the boundary and creating value 1. Because of this culture, the active 
involvement of university officials has been reduced, as compared to the “pioneering 
ages” when people like Vannevar Bush and Fredric Terman were instrumental in the 
creation of firms, such as Hewlett Packard, and institutions, such as technology licensing 
and the venture capital firm2.  Nevertheless, early university pioneering efforts were 
diffused primarily in the U.S. university system. Since 1980, when the Bayh-Dole Act3 
was enacted, an official and regulatory practice has developed in the US, showing, 
perhaps, the strongest example today of how the boundary, instead of being a barrier, can 
become a managed interface. Technology Transfer Offices (TTOs) or Offices of 
Technology Licensing (OTLs) were built at the universities, focusing on capturing 
university inventions as IP and issuing licenses, while paying respect to the open 
                                                
1 Saxenian, A. 1994. Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128. 
Cambridge Harvard University Press; Etzkowitz, H. 2002. MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science, 
Routledge, London 
2 Etzkowitz, H. 2002. MIT and the Rise of Entrepreneurial Science, Routledge, London. 
3 35 U.S.C. §200-212; 37 C.F.R. Part 401.  For more information on Bayh-Dole within this paper, see 
section University as licensor – the Columbia example. p. 12 
University
Open exchange
Researchers and 
students build
recognition
capital
Surrounding economy
Market 
transactions
Firms build
financial
capitalOccasional innovations 
bridge the boundary
4 (29) 
exchange mission of the university, as well as allowing the public, the university, the 
inventor and commercial developers to share in the benefits of the transfer (see Figure 2). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. University technology transfer offices (TTOs) in the U.S. manage the interface 
between open exchange and market transactions under the Bayh-Dole regulation from 
1980. 
 
In a recent study of twelve, specifically selected, U.S. universities, conclusions found that 
the most prominent denominator for U.S. universities that have been particularly 
successful in their technology transfer and commercialization efforts was the adoption of 
a central, integral focus on “being a player” in regional economic development4.  This 
“player” recognition occurred both within and outside the universities.  Most of the 
twelve universities, acknowledged in the study for their success, had a systemic and 
integrated approach to technology partnering, where technology transfer was part of a 
larger whole.  The universities also strived to develop long-term collaboration projects 
with industry, which often developed into technology transfer relationships.  In addition, 
the twelve universities, in comparison to others, offered extensive executive training, 
which enabled them to establish close relations hips with industr ial partners. 
 
                                                
4 Tornatzky, L.G., Waugaman, P.G. and Gray, D.O. 2002. Innovation U: New University Roles in the 
Knowledge Economy , Research Triangle Park, N.C.: Southern Growth Policies Board. 
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The twelve universities had in-house competencies in patenting, licensing and 
commercialization, and had developed expertise in launching start-ups, encouraging their 
faculty to participate in, though not necessarily run the ventures. Most of the twelve 
universities were also actively involved in fostering local entrepreneurial ventures 
through initiatives such as incubators and educational programs.   
 
Many countries, such as Germany, Denmark, Norway and Japan, have recently adopted a 
Bayh-Dole type of regulation, giving their universities the responsibilities, rights and 
(occasionally) the resources to patent and license inventions. Universities in these 
countries do not have the same history of organic experimentation that preceded the 
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act in the U.S.  There are, however, other important 
particular experiences to learn from, in which non-U.S. universities have become 
involved in commodification and realization of knowledge stemming from research. In 
Sweden, and in particular at Chalmers University of Technology, a tradition of 
facilitating, developing and eventually investing in new ventures has evolved since the 
1960’s5. This tradition exemplifies the involvement of universities well beyond the stage 
of the actual research and invention disclosure and into venture creation. This tradition 
also exemplifies an (engineering) behavior of building value in ventures, which, in some 
ways, contrasts the U.S. foci on IP marketing and technology brokering. 
 
Today, different universities and countries have taken different paths towards engaging in 
commodification and commercialization of knowledge. In the U.S., licensing practices at 
university TTOs are beginning to evolve after 20-25 years of operation since the 
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980.  Changes taking place in operative practices 
may cause a shift in the way TTOs and universities act, in regard to transference of 
research in the future, perhaps moving away from a strictly licensing structure to a hybrid 
of licensing/start-up or pure venture creation model.  In contrast, Sweden may shortly 
follow its Nordic counterparts in shifting its regulations regarding university research 
ownership from individual ownership of IP by the professor/researcher, known as the 
                                                
5 For an overview of Swedish research and innovation policy as well as more insights into the Chalmers 
case please see Jacob, Lundqvist, Hellsmark, 2003, Entrepreneurial Transformation in the Swedish 
University System: the case of Chalmers University of Technology. Research Policy 32, 1555-1568. 
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teacher’s exemption, to university ownership, thus adopting a Bayh-Dole type of 
regulation.  Regulation augmentation will probably have repercussions in the current 
venture creation/innovation system models that exist at institutions such as Chalmers. 
 
If universities are indeed to walk down paths of commercializing knowledge, there is 
reason for a search for a “new intellectual infrastructure” of universities, in which the  
commercial roles and practices of universities converge. Such a new infrastructure could 
both help to fuel the knowledge economy, while also creating stronger clarity around the 
social contract of universities.  By providing two significantly different case illustrations 
– Columbia in New York and Chalmers in Sweden – including some converging trends, 
the paper aims at anchoring universal conceptual elements of such a new university 
infrastructure, in terms of the roles played and norms applied, and in terms of an object-
oriented process of commodifying inventions into IP. In doing so, the paper hopefully 
invites further constructive exploration towards a new university infrastructure around 
knowledge commercialization. 
 
The paper is organized as follows: First, the controversial issue of universities 
increasingly becoming commercial actors is discussed and different arguments are 
outlined. Next, an intellectual capital perspective of the university and its surrounding 
economy is introduced to help  provide an overarching framework for understanding how 
commodification and commercialization of knowledge can be carried out within a 
university platform concerned with open exchange, while still interacting in a market 
economy. Thereafter, the two cases – Columbia and Chalmers – are presented, while 
paying respect to both historical and regulatory backgrounds. The analysis explores 
consistencies, compatibilities and areas of conflict, while applying both a role-oriented 
and an object-oriented perspective. Finally, implications center on the opportunities and 
threats that exist when expanding a Bayh-Dole type of regulation beyond U.S. borders.  
Additional focus is placed on the challenges a new infrastructure requires, in terms of 
complex interplays and new balanc ing acts for research groups, university managers and 
other actors in the transference process. 
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Spanning boundaries between open exchange, licensing and venture creation 
Spanning the boundary between open exchange and market transactions is as much a 
theoretical challenge as a practical one. The concern here is to outline what universities 
can do on the structural level for increasing or maximizing the responsible utilization of 
new knowledge in society under the constraint of preserving the university task of 
governing open exchange, open science and the fair building of recognition capital 
among its researchers and students. Most universities of the world, except perhaps some 
so-called corporate universities, are concerned with preserving these “constraints”. Even 
though commercialization efforts may increase in the future, few believe that this should 
be at the expense of an open exchange model.  
 
However, national regimes, university cultures, as well as managerial practices may 
differ significantly. To bridge these differences in a way that allows for constructive 
learning and convergence, a theoretical framework that recognizes different traditions 
and values, while being sufficiently distinct, is needed. Here the focus will be upon two 
phenomena: 1) the role (and norms) of the university when managing and investing in 
both open exchange and  IP commercialization, and 2) the object-oriented process, in 
which new knowledge is packaged into a claimable object (e.g. patentable invention) and 
further developed into IP, licenses or new ventures. 
 
Expanding the role of the university 
As indicated in Figures 1 and 2 above, as well as in the reasoning in the previous section, 
one can apply an “intellectual capital” perspective upon the university and the 
surrounding economy. More specifically, and in alignment with Bourdieu and others6, the 
university world invests in open exchange resulting in knowledge in the public domain 
and in the building of type of cultural capital, which we label recognition capital, that 
depends upon a combination of the individual’s personal achievements and the 
individual’s adherence to standards set by e.g. universities. With specific rules of conduct 
on how to publish, acknowledge credit to others, etc., the building of recognition capita l 
                                                
6 See for instance Bourdieu, P. 1988. Homo Academicus. (Stanford: Stanford University Press.) about the 
building of capital in academic settings and Petrusson, U. 2004. Intellectual Property Management and 
Entrepreneurship, CIP/Göteborg for a comprehensive intellectual capital perspective. 
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of individuals is enabled. Recognition capital can occasionally be transformed into 
currency through the individual raising his/her salary, receiving tenure or doing 
consultancy work. However, it is not normally possible to commercialize the creative 
achievement (i.e. the published work). On the contrary, by avoiding the issue of “who 
gets paid for what”, certain types of collective open exchange achievements, such as open 
source software development or mapping the surface of Mars, can be efficiently 
coordinated, especially now with the help of Internet and modern information and 
communication technology (ICT)7. 
 
While investing in open exchange is, and arguably will, remain the key task of 
universities, there are two other types of investments that can co ntribute to increasing the 
financial (or economic) value of new university based knowledge: investment in 
licensing and investment in venture creation (see Figure 3). Investments in licensing 
typically focus on the identification of interesting knowledge objects to package into IP 
and are marketed towards relevant licensees. The role is primarily one of “technology 
brokering” in which the ability to network and market a technology is critical for success. 
Venture creation is an alternative way of building capital, in which human creativeness is 
captured within a venture, allowing initial new knowledge and IP to be complemented 
with other assets, leveraged into proofs of principles, proofs of concepts, brands, products 
and/or services. 
 
Bringing these two types of investment processes into the realm of the open exchange 
university, creates potential tensions and conflicts between all three. The two cases to be 
explored – Columbia and Chalmers – have primarily integrated licensing and venture 
creation, respectively, into their roles and “brand image”. These universities have a 
history of responding to external and internal reactions concerning their respective 
blending of Open Exchange/Licensing and Open Exchange/Venture Creation. Both 
Columbia and Chalmers, and  the types of university structures they represent, are also 
heading towards the intersection of all three roles, albeit from different points of 
                                                
7 Reference here to Stefan Thorpenberg for the linking of open science and open source philosophy in a 
chapter in a book in progress, edited and coordinated by CIP. 
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departure. It is in this intersection that a “new intellectual infrastructure” is to be 
explored. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Universities are expanding a realm of Open Exchange into realms of Licensing 
and Venture Creation. The two cases – Columbia and Chalmers – operate in two realms 
and are both heading towards combining three roles.  
 
An object-oriented perspective focuses on the commodification of knowledge, or – more 
specifically – on a new knowledge object and how it is identified, claimed, licensed, 
and/or packaged into a venture (see Figure 4). While an object-oriented perspective is 
very natural for licensing professionals and researchers operating under a Bayh-Dole type 
of regulation, it is not obvious for persons operating in the traditional sciences, where 
open science/exchange and informal collaborations with industry are the norm. From the 
latter, knowledge is often seen as something relational and occurring in the exchange, 
rather than as something primarily objectifiable. The issue of objectifying and 
commodifying knowledge is therefore a debated phenomenon8. Arguments on one side 
state that increased commodification will hinder the efficiency of open exchange research 
as well as increase barriers of entry for innovations, due to increased costs of licensing to 
                                                
8 See e.g. Nelson, R.R., 2003, The Market Economy, and the Scientific Commons* 
 Richard R., Columbia University working paper, August 11, 2003 
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actors commercially claiming basic research results. Arguments on the other side state 
that deve lopments in ICT, making certain knowledge much more codifiable, have 
irreversibly transformed the process of research from having been more relationship -
based to being more object-oriented. The strong link between ICT and biotechnology 
(DNA is basically information), and the dominant appearance of biotechnology 
breakthrough patents in license oriented university research, has, according to this 
argument, made it too late to reverse developments into non-object-oriented research9.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. An object-oriented model of university-involvement including decisions and 
activities that result in economic value creation through licensing and/or venture 
creation10. 
 
This “defacto” argument allows us to propose the object-oriented choice-model in Figure 
4, while returning to this controversy again with “new eyes” in the in the end of the 
paper. As indicated in Figure 4, the two types of commercial roles to be explored further 
in the two cases – licensing and venture creation – seem, at least in theory and  on a 
                                                
9 This paper reflects the interdisciplinary discussions occurring on the CIP Symposium on the 
“Entrepreneurial University” in June 1-3 2004, in Gothenburg, Sweden (www.cip.chalmers.se), and in a 
subsequent book-writing process exploring different models of commercializing research. 
10 The model stems from a book writing workshop organized by CIP in New York April 1st 2005. Special 
reference in this case to Gregory Graff. 
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surface level, to be possible to combine. Important to note is that there are underlying 
assumptions behind the proposed model in Figure 4, such as universities owning IP, and 
universities inviting external engagement prior to investing more of their  own resources. 
Other models, such as transferring IP ownership (rather than licensing) or investing a 
priori in promising ventures (rather than first inviting external investors) are also 
possible. The present model, however, conforms to Bayh-Dole regulations and has 
benefits that will be discussed further after the two case illustrations. 
 
Universities as licensors – the Columbia example 
For over a decade, Columbia University has been one of the top three universities 
generating income from commercialization of university developed research.  In 1994, 
Columbia was second only to Stanford in university licensing income, but by 2001 had 
far surpassed them, in part because of the expiration of one of Stanford’s main 
“blockbuster”11 patents in 1997 (the Cohen-Boyer patent), and the discovery and filing by 
Columbia of its own “blockbuster”.  Indeed, a substantial portion Columbia’s 
commercialization revenue has come from royalties received from licenses of four key 
patented technologies, called the “Big Four”.  These four technologies are: 1) Co-
Transformation: a genetic engineering process; 2) Xalatan: a glaucoma treatment; 3) 
Soluble CD4: anti-body technology (together with Stanford University), and 4) MPEG-2: 
digital compression technology. These technologies, particularly Co-Transformation 
(likened to Stanford’s Cohen-Boyer patent), have been crucial to the external recognition 
of success of Columbia’s technology transfer process, but have also placed the university 
under scrutiny.   
 
Columbia University is one of the oldest and most prestigious universities in the United 
States, and includes the earliest established medical faculty in the country12.  The 
university comprises of not only a medical school, but also and engineering, law, 
                                                
11 Licensed technology that generates substantial royalties. 
12 In fact, the establishment of the medical faculty of the school, eventually to be known as Columbia 
University, pre-dates the United States as an independent country.  Columbia was originally founded in 
1754, as King’s College under the British Royal Charter, was re-chartered as Columbia College in 1784 
after the United States gained its independence, and then was again re-chartered as Columbia University in 
1896.   
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business and liberal arts and sciences, as well as additional specialty graduate schools.  In 
1928, Columbia developed the first integrated medical research, education and clinical 
care facility in the United States.  Today, the university consists of more than 23,000 
students and 3,000 faculty members, with an additional 4,000 researchers/clinicians.  The 
university produces undergraduate, graduate and post-graduate degrees, and has among 
its accolades, 70 Nobel Prizes, over 500 patents, and an accumulated ½ Billion USD in 
research support.  Thus, the university has substantial resources for the creation of 
research and intellectual property.   
 
While at the forefront in many areas of academia, Columbia University was late-comer to 
technology transfer, relative to the other major U.S. research universities. Indeed the 
earliest TTO was at the University of Wisconsin, prior to WWII, but several other 
universities began establishing or hiring technology transfer offices in the 1960’s and 
onward.  However, some key universities, including Columbia were reluctant to engage 
in patenting and technology transfer activities, particularly regarding medical research. 
This is particularly noted in the university regulations that prohibited medical faculty 
from patenting inventions until 1975. Indeed, Columbia only patented one of its key 
technologies just prior to the effective date of The Bayh-Dole Act, arguably the most 
important piece of U.S. legislation pertaining to technology transfer and intellectual 
property ownership rights.13  
 
The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 came about as result of “…concern, along with growing 
dissatisfaction within Congress and the industrial community over the lack of uniformity 
in patent rights to inventions resulting from federally funding research…”14, and to a 
great extent was due to the efforts and support of various national organizations of 
colleges and universities.  The Act was established to encourage the utilization of 
                                                
13 Mowery, Nelson, Sampat, Zedonis. 2001. The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: 
An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Research Policy 30, 99-119.  
14 Mowery, D. January 2005. The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology Entrepreneurship in U.S. 
Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else? Colloquium on Entrepreneurship Education and 
Technology Transfer. p 11 
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inventions created and produced under federal funding 15, thus promoting the involvement 
of universities in the commercialization process. “Before Bayh-Dole, the federal 
government had accumulated 30,000 patents, of which only 5% had been licensed and 
even fewer had found their way into commercial products.”16 The policy permits both 
exclusive licensing and retention of title with transfer of an invention to for-profit 
agencies, but encourages broader licensing practices, namely non-exclusive, with an 
emphasis on transference to start-up or small businesses, with the ultimate objective of 
being maximum benefit to society.  The university is given the responsibility to, in a 
timely manner, identify and transfer technology from within its research departments 
(this process is often called due diligence), but in turn, is given a reasonable time frame in 
which to patent the inventions/technology with security of secrecy.  The government 
maintains royalty- free, non-exclusive rights to inventions for government purposes 
(called march- in rights).  The government is also allowed march- in rights if it is deemed 
that the university is not performing due diligence.17   
 
The main financial support for university research comes from U.S. national and regional 
government funding organizations, namely the National Science Foundation (NSF), 
along with other national funding organizations 18, as well as state science and research 
funding organizations, which provide substantial innovation focused funding, including 
approximately 90% of university research funding.  In U.S. university technology 
transfer, the organizations involved in commercializing knowledge are the universities 
and colleges, their administrative and academic departments, leadership and members, as 
well as external suppliers of funding, research and advice.  The institutions directly 
influencing these organizations are mainly government regulations, but also state and 
                                                
15 The Bayh-Dole Act plays a significant role in technology transfer at U.S. universities, because the 
majority of R&D funding, approximately 90%, comes from federal or state or private funding (a small 
portion of the 90%), with only approximately 10% from industry.  As mentioned in Section 3.0, the NSF, 
DOE, DOD, NASA, and NHHS (in part through SBIR and STTR), are the main funding organizations.   
16 President of the Association of American Universities. 
17 The Bayh-Dole Act: 35 U.S.C. §200-212; 37 C.F.R. Part 401 
18 Along with the NSF, the Dept. of Energy (DOE), the Dept. of Defense (DOD), National Air and Space 
Assoc. (NASA), and National Health and Human Services Dept (NHHS), through the Small Business 
Innovation Research (SBIR) and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) programs, substantiate 
significant innovation funding. http://www.acq.osd.mil/sadbu/sbir/homepg.htm 
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local regulations, as well as university rules and norms, and the ‘unwritten rules’ 
developed within the cultures of the various research departments of the universities.   
 
At Columbia, the current technology transfer process is carried out by Science and 
Technology Ventures19 (S&TV), the commercialization arm of the university.  S&TV 
was founded in 1982 and consists of two facilities in New York City: one at the main 
campus, adjacent to several of the engineering departments, and one at the medical 
school campus, in the university hospital facility.  S&TV is overseen by an Executive 
Director, and three managers focused on 1) New Ventures, 2) S&TV Partnerships, and 3) 
Economic Development.  The rest of the organization works in a matrix formation, 
within the broad areas of either health sciences or general sciences, and focusing on 
particular research departments.  The core of the approximately 30-member staff is made 
up of Technology Licensing Officers (TLOs).   
 
It is both from within and through this quagmire that innovations must be harvested and 
pushed to market. Bayh-Dole encourages technology transfer that stimulates or supports 
new or small businesses.  Based on AUTM20 annual reports from 2001 and 2002, small 
businesses21 seemed to have received over 50% (up to 54%) of academic licenses.  Start-
up firms and firms spun-out specifically to commercialize licensed technology only 
received approximately 15% of licenses.  The remainder (32-33%) went to big business.22  
At Columbia, licensing revenue represented 31% of total income in 2003; this percentage 
increased to 40% in 2004.  If we revisit the “Big Four”, we can see not only the 
substantial returns to the research departments of Columbia, but the significant 
contributions to the U.S. economy and GDP (Gross Domestic Product) as well as 
significant, unquantifiable social benefits: 
1) Co-Transformation is a recombinant DNA process based from research of 
Richard Axel, Saul Silverstein, and Michael J. Wigler ~ sometimes called the 
                                                
19 Information gathered from research visit to Columbia’s S&TV office in December of 2004. 
www.stv.columbia.edu 
20 Association of University Technology Managers: www.autm.net 
21 Less than 500 employees 
22 Mowery, D. January 2005. The Bayh-Dole Act and High-Technology Entrepreneurship in U.S. 
Universities: Chicken, Egg, or Something Else? Colloquium on Entrepreneurship Education and 
Technology Transfer. p16. 
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fourth of the Axel patents (the other three expired in 2000).  The patents are 
valued at over 600 Million USD, though Columbia never earned more than 1% 
royalty.  The patent has helped to make an estimated 60 Billion USD contribution 
to GDP (economy) and is licensed non-exclusively to more than 30 different 
(biotech) companies.  In 2003, Columbia was sued by three key U.S. biotech 
companies over the Axel patent, claiming that the university was attempting to 
create a “patent monopoly”.  “Many observers of the litigation say the case, 
extremely unusual within the world of technology transfer, was initiated because 
of the large sums of money the patent had generated.”23; money that is transferred 
directly back to the inventor, research department, school (medical, etc.) and 
university through a revenue sharing distribution24. 
2) Xalatan is a prostaglandin-based drug (prostrate gland), licensed first to UpJohn 
and then Pharmacia (now Pfizer), used in the treatment of Glaucoma25.  It is an 
example of a technology that had to be licensed to a large company in order to be 
developed further, because it was mainly the large companies that had also done 
research in prostrate glands.  An excess of 250 Million USD has been earned 
through licensing, but this income stream will soon come to an end, as the patent 
will expire shortly.  
3) Soluble CD4 is soluble protein developed into an antibody technology used in a 
prototype for a drug to fight AIDS.  This was transferred through an exclusive 
license to a small biotech company, Centercore, now owned by Johnson & 
Johnson, and has generated substantial revenue.  Technologies are often licensed 
to small companies that are then bought by larger firms.  This process emphasizes 
the importance of licensing structures tha t ensure Columbia’s royalty percentages 
are not diluted, i.e. called pass-through royalties in the license.   
4) MPEG-2 is the only of the “big four” that is not a bio-based technology.  MPEG-2 
is digital compression technology, mainly utilized in video technology.  
                                                
23 Biotechs sue Columbia over fourth Axel patent. Nature Biotechnology, Volume 21, Number 9, Sept. 
2003. 
24 If the net revenue is less than 100,000 USD, then 50% goes to the inventor, 25% to the university and 
25% to the inventor’s research.  If the net revenue is greater than 100,000 USD, then 33.33% goes to the 
university, 25% to the inventor, 25% to the inventor’s research, 8.33% to the department that delivered the 
research, and 8.33% to the school (ex. medical, arts and sciences, engineering, etc.).  From S&TV.   
25 A diseas e that affects eyesight and can lead to blindness. 
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Columbia’s patents are joined together with others into a portfolio of over 700 
patents (134 patent families) owned by 25 international companies/organizations, 
called MPEG-LA26.  This represents an almost open-source like structure that was 
established to ensure reasonable and nondiscriminatory access to rights necessary 
for the standardization of MPEG-2 technology.  The license covers products 
developed from June 1994 and onward. 
 
While S&TV enjoys one of the largest sets of resources for a TTO in the U.S., there is 
still a general feeling from within that the organization cannot perform optimally due to 
structural constraints in internal technology transfer policies.  For example, a desire for a 
greater degree of freedom regarding licensing income return, directed into a discretionary 
seed fund (the amount is currently limited and not substantial enough to support more 
than one to three new firms per year), could allow for the additional development of 
commercially viable research. There is also a feeling of an eminent shift in the near 
future. The majority of the “low hanging fruit”27 and/or “blockbusters” have been 
harvested, and the operative definition of licensable technology has changed, in part 
because external structures (particularly the biotech and pharmaceutical industries) have 
matured. Furthermore, the license agreements linked to these “blockbusters” are 
beginning to expire. Revenue must come from other forms of commercialization. 
University regulations at Columbia disallow the ownership of public stock in start-up 
companies created out of the university research28, thus theoretically hindering the 
"innovation model" and the potential fiscal return.  However, this policy is 
understandable because of the complex and “ethically blurred” direction that it would 
lead Columbia; i.e. becoming a fund manager or broker on the market, and thus 
seemingly acting in a capacity apart from the mission and objective of the university.  
 
                                                
26 www.mpegla.com 
27 Technology that is relatively easily licensed or commercialized, and substantiates revenue. 
28 Columbia’s policy allows S&TV to have equity ownership in a start -up or spin-out, but only prior or to 
the moment of the initial public offer.  At this point, S&TV must exchange its equity for cash at the IPO 
market price.  Columbia’s policy is to prevent S&TV from developing into a fund manager (of equity in 
start -ups that have gone public).   
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For Columbia, the objectification of ideas that can be transferred has been the main focus 
since even before Bayh-Dole was enacted.  But, because of the trends listed in the 
previous paragraph, Columbia is starting to utilize longer-term strategies while 
maintaining operations that ensure the immediate or short-term benefits that have made it 
so “successful”. Focusing attention on long-term benefits illustrates the importance of the 
development of networks and communities of practice.   This is emphasized within the 
internal metrics staff identified as keys to future success. 
· Individual skill set of TTO personnel, including: 
o Ability to establish and maintain relationships (personable) – sales 
o Analytical, detail oriented 
o Visionary: opportunity/innovation recognition 
o A driver/closer: ability to manage and negotiate deals 
· Network connectivity 
· Licensing income, research agreements, etc. 
· Contribution to GDP 
· Long-term strategy 
· Degrees of freedom to operate 
For Columbia, there is now a convergence towards the importance not only of the objects 
but also the structures surrounding the objects that can continue to stimulate economic 
growth even after the transferred objects decrease or lose their value.  Because of this, 
Chalmers School of Entrepreneurship presents and interesting parallel example.   
 
Universities as venture creators – the Chalmers example 
Chalmers School of Entrepreneurship (CSE), together with other key actors in Chalmers 
so called innovation system, represents a radical departure from the traditional methods 
of intellectual ownership and technology transfer commonly found in Sweden, and in 
many parts of Europe.  The responsibility of commercialization is spread beyond the 
shoulders of one individual (typically the researcher/professor) to a team of venture 
creators, in a process that emphasizes the entrepreneurial role.  Through this process, 
CSE links entrepreneurial training with applicative transformation and development of 
research and innovation, founded both within and outside the university, into new 
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ventures.  In less than a decade, CSE has successfully created over 30 companies, 
employing over 150 individuals and attracted approximately 20 Million USD in venture 
capital and soft financing.  At the same time, the school has also graduated 138 trained 
entrepreneurs while building relationships with dozens of idea providers within and 
outside the Chalmers University environment. 
 
The traditional Swedish university environment operates under the regulation of the 
teachers’ exemption.  This law gives intellectual property (IP) ownership to the 
researcher/professor within the university, regardless of where the funding for the 
research originated, if not otherwise bilaterally agreed.  The teachers’ exemption was 
enacted in 1949 and was meant to compensate for the low level of pay available to 
university professors, by enabling them to seek out substitutive revenue for their human 
capital.  In addition, the exemption was meant to allow for the maximization of scientific 
benefit through control of research results, thus allowing for additional means of 
commercialization. This policy structure placed a significant responsibility on the 
shoulders of the professor/researcher to not only identify research applicable for market 
activity, but to then also engage in the transference or commodification of that research, 
either through transactions with other market actors, or through the creation of new firms.  
While there certainly were individuals willing and able to take on such entrepreneurial 
roles, the activities mentioned above went against the fundamental desire of the majorit y 
of researchers/professors to continue their focus on their research, i.e. to be a “basic  
researcher”. 
 
In the 1960’s, an electronics professor at Chalmers University of Technology, started 
championing the idea of transforming university technology into university spin-offs, 
thereby pioneering an awareness and positive attitude towards commercialization at the 
university. However, because of the traditio nal role perception of the “basic researcher”, 
and of the technology transfer policy focus on the individual, innovations developed from 
within the university have remained an exception to common practice. New 
developments emerged at Chalmers in the late 1990’s, focused on finding new pathways 
for applicable research to the marketplace, still giving the professor partial ownership and 
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influence, while also freeing his/her hands of the venture creation operational processes, 
thus allowing for the practice of basic research. 
 
CSE has had two stages of development and operation since its inception in 1997. 
Version 1 of CSE (1997-2000) was designed as an educational track for engineering and 
architecture students beginning their final year at Chalmers.  To accomplish the objective 
of developing entrepreneurs, several innovative steps were taken.  The first measure was 
the design of a special student recruitment process, including written applications, tests 
and psychological consultants.  At the same time, an idea recruitment process was 
established, in order to select good ideas from research or companies around Chalmers, 
from which the student teams would develop their businesses.  The education and 
execution of the projects was designed to be carried out in an incubation environment 
(this later became the business incubator Chalmers Innovation).  Finally, course modules 
were built, basing as much as possible upon the real situations in the projects. 
 
In 1999, the planning of Version 2 of CSE (2000-2004) was initiated.  Several 
components were added.  The first of these was the evolving of CSE from a last-year 
education track for engineering and architecture students, into the Swedish equivalent of 
a Master of Science in Innovation and Entrepreneurship program, open for students who 
have reached a bachelor degree level. An Entrepreneurship fund was created, through 
which CSE started taking an active stake in the innovations projects, while attracting 
venture capital to the business development.  At the same time, strong ties were knit with 
the new Center for Intellectual Property studies, thereby providing international 
competence on how to build and secure intellectual assets (i.e. how to build knowledge -
based ventures).   
 
The innovation projects at CSE stem from research at Chalmers, from other universities, 
or from small or large firms. The intellectual property of the project is contractually 
secured by the CSE Fund, prior to the project start. This procedure prohibits unfruitful 
negotiations during the project year and establishes “fair play” for all actors. The 
innovation projects are often early patented or patentable ideas that need the 
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complementary entrepreneurial driving force to reach the market. The aim is to start a 
new venture, based upon the ideas created during the project year. Projects today range 
from research intensive to product sales and end-user driven, with an increased number of 
projects coming from Gothenburg University as well as from established firms, in the 
form of corporate spin-outs.  
 
When the CSE was first created, it was expected that approximately one project per year 
would transform into a start-up company.  Results have exceeded these expectations to 
the extent that, in the second version (from 2000), an average of four companies per year 
have been started within classes containing approximately 20 students, per year, working 
in teams of three. The following are three representative companies:   
1) Oxeon was founded by CSE in 2002, and is based on patented research into 
technical textiles, developed at Chalmers University of Technology in the mid 
1990s.  For several years the inventor attempted to commercialize the research, 
through, among other things, attract ing business angels to invest. In 2002, restart 
of the project was carried out in collaboration with CSE, in which is the business 
was focused on a technique for ind ustrializing the manufacture of band-woven 
composites.  Today, the company, among other things, works with Formula 1 car 
producers.29 
2) Midorion was founded by CSE in 2003, and is based on a basic breakthrough in 
nanotechnology research, jointly developed at Chalmers University of 
Technology and Sahlgrenska Academy (the medical school of Gothenburg). CSE 
was, at a very early stage of the innovation development engaged together in an 
interplay with a strong and committed board, the inventor (who in this case joined 
the company after finishing her PhD) and the team of former students. From this 
group, Midorion was started, to develop a “sensor on a chip” able to detect single 
molecules, aiming at drug discovery applications.30 
3) Lamera was founded by CSE in 2004, and represents technology utilized from 
outside the university structure.  Lamera is based on a patented sandwich material 
                                                
29 www.oxeon.se 
30 www.midorion.com 
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that had been researched and developed at length within the Volvo Corporation. 
After difficulties in commercializing the new high-performance material towards, 
primarily, vehicle-applications, Volvo Technology Transfer contacted CSE to 
make a final attempt at finding new applications. The joint venture between CSE, 
Volvo and the students also serves as an example of CSE collaboration being an 
option for developing non-core business technologies from established firms. The 
material is now initially commercialized towards non-vehicle applications, e.g.  
bicycle helmets, where establishment barriers are lower and margins are expected 
to be higher.31 
 
Not only have multiple companies been created while within the university structure, but 
students also continued engage in start-up opportunities after the graduation period. More 
than half of the alumni remain in the start-up environment.  Students also pursue careers 
as business developers in large firms (approximately 20%), as business development 
consultants (approx. 10%), as service providers or in research (approx. 10%). 
 
As identified above, the process of identifying success is twofold, and represents the 
initiated convergence towards value creation in the new intellectual infrastructure.  The 
foremost objective has been and continues to be the development of human capital, 
represented in the education and dispersion of entrepreneurial leaders into society.  These 
educational pursuits can be measured by:    
· Development of skills and tools 
· Network connectivity 
· Timely opportunity recognition, including quantification and valuation of project 
applications  
· Capability to balance risk and ambiguity 
However, the development of the entrepreneur does not end with the student, but is also 
established through the connections with researchers, professors, and/or idea providers, 
that exist both within and outside the university structures.  These individuals experience 
a less concrete, but longer-term engagement in the entrepreneurial learning process. The 
                                                
31 www.lamera.se 
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secondary objective of CSE is the practical application of ideas harvested from 
researchers, professors, and idea providers, and coupled together with the students into 
the creation of venture firms.  This represents the importance of commodification of 
human capital into structures that hold market recognition; the formation and operation of 
companies. For the creation of new ventures, success measurement must be applied to 
both the pre- incubation CSE program as well as the additional stages of Chalmers 
innovation system.  Criteria include: 
· Capture of intellectual capital into structural capital 
o Including company formation 
· Valuation and value recognition by the market (external financing)  
· Employment 
· Turnover 
The metrics presented attempt to meet multiple and, at times, divergent objectives, which 
limits the obtainable measurements.  These limitations emphasize the need for 
collaborative activity and illustrate why there is beginning to be a convergence towards a 
new territory, in which these divergent objectives are more closely aligned.   
 
Analyzing the cases 
This section comprises an analysis of lessons learned from the cases, including an 
understanding in the differences of approaches, of any converging trends, as well as a 
discussion of the challenges that may be faced when choosing one path or the other. 
 
Lessons learned from Columbia 
Columbia developed a successful and lucrative licensing process in a relatively short 
period of time, 15 years, mainly based on the opportunities presented by the Bayh-Dole 
Act; and without a pre-established history of organic entrepreneurial activities, such as 
those that existed at Stanford and MIT, prior to Bayh-Dole.  It is therefore relatively safe 
to conclude that the enactment of Bayh-Dole, gave Columbia an “immediate” market 
presence and market power, which were critical in accomplishing successful licensing 
agreements. Universities in non-Bayh-Dole environments and in environments with less 
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coordinated federal public research spending are arguably having a tougher time in 
gaining such market acceptance and market power. 
 
In the Columbia case, it is also important to note the strong history of an interdisciplinary 
organized medical school, which has likely been critical in developing key inventions, 
readily exploitable through licensing. This collaboration has helped to establish synergies 
that have likely been crucial to the generation of three “blockbuster” biotech licenses, and 
not just one, which could have been regarded as luck or an anomaly..  However, the 
backing from favorable regulations and a strong interdisc iplinary research tradition do  
not fully explain the Columbia phenomenon. Sophisticated commercial collaborative 
arrangements also need to be recognized. Two successful examples signify this aspect: 
the MPEG-2 patents being pooled into the MPEG-LA construction, and the collaboration 
with a key industrial actor for development of the glaucoma drug. 
 
Comparing Columbia with the “ideal model” in Figure 4, an inclination towards 
packaging as many inventions as possible into license agreements can be found  (see 
Figure 5). Columbia expresses a strong desire and trend towards greater involvement into 
later venture creation stages, but such activities would require more revenues being 
invested. The financial success of Columbia licensing, might have overshadowed the 
potential that the licensing approach also has in promoting public interests, such as 
regional growth, maximizing constructive utilization of knowledge, increasing public 
health, etc. The licenses issued by Columbia, (and most certainly by many other U.S. 
universities), do actually allow such interests to be governed, though this is often 
neglected when focusing on university revenues from licensing. This effect – i.e. to 
impose public interests through the licensing tool – needs to be seen as part of the Bayh-
Dole stipulated licensing model, and would be lost if universities, instead of licensing, 
transferred ownership rights to private interests, or only were interested in governing 
minority equity positions in ventures. The latter models would only be revenue-
generating for universities, not allowing the university to remain responsible for how new 
knowledge is utilized in society. 
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Figure 5. The key path for technology transfer at Columbia, as compared with the 
reference model in Figure 4. 
 
Lessons learned from Chalmers 
Chalmers School of Entrepreneurship represents an institution that holds a legitimacy and 
acceptance of entrepreneurial activity, based on a long history of championing such 
efforts from within the university, then coupled together with the proactive innovation 
measures adopted in the early 1990’s.  These activities are perhaps most readily seen in 
the facilitation of down-stream activities, mainly focusing on spin-outs and new venture 
creation.  Chalmers  and the surrounding society has learned the importance of CSE being 
involved in down-stream venture creation, not because of large revenue streams – they 
are yet to be proven – but because of the societal recognition and relevance such 
involvement is given in comparison to traditional research. Hence, a small investment per 
year in venture creation, as compared to Chalmers overall budget, results in a profiling of 
and strategic marketing of Chalmers in society. As a potential bonus, on top of this , 
remains potential revenue from equity positions. 
 
Another significant lesson from the CSE case is the development of human capital along 
with the development of IP. This synergy can both be seen as a conscious risk strategy – 
i.e. students get a grade even if a project fails, and therefore also “high-hanging fruits” 
are pursued – and as a way of consciously developing more entrepreneurial professional 
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roles. The CSE model enables for scientists, students and collaborative partners to 
demonstrate and prove entrepreneurial skills. The recognition capital gained through 
learning and applying established norms of a profession is thus expanded  into also 
encompassing entrepreneurial dimensions, whether that of being a scientist spending 
“extraordinary efforts” on validating a technology, or as a student building an 
entrepreneurial track-record, beyond expectations of the curricula32.  
 
Thus, through the entrep reneurial role emphasis, in which the object oriented approach in 
Figure 4 is more implicit, CSE’s objective is in capturing the human that holds the capital 
and teaching that human how to  not only commodify the ir own knowledge, but also 
identify and commodify the human capital of others into products and into a venture that 
can evolve beyond the initially identified idea (see Figure 6).  However, this human 
capital focus also points to a problem in the current CSE model. The lack of regulations 
and policies around a disclosure procedure and how proper ownership of university-based 
inventions should be established, also creates complex situations, in which 
degunkification of IP claims needs to be carried out in parallel with identification and 
development of commercial claims. As a result the CSE model invests first in the 
relationship with a potential inventor, and thereafter looks into all the relevant issues in 
developing “the object”. All these special aspects are captured in the adapted object- and 
human capital oriented model in F igure 6. Several decades of relatively little spontaneous 
venture creation and lack of a boundary-spanning (university-business boundary) 
entrepreneurial activity helps to motivate the relevance for such a model. However, in a 
more regulated Bayh-Dole type of environment, opportunities for a more systematic and 
efficient step by step validation of commercial potential could probably be pursued. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
32 Lundqvist, M.A., 2004, Entrepreneurial roles in the university, paper presented at the CIP symposium on 
“The Entrepreneurial University”, June 1-3, in Gothenburg. 
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Figure 6. The Chalmers (CSE) model, focusing on contractually committing inventors 
before dedicating resource in a collaborative process of investigating the potential for a 
new venture. 
 
Converging trends 
Columbia is now engaging in more and more start-up and spin-off activity, with an 
increasing aspiration for self- funding of certain projects. There is also increased 
incorporation of students into the opportunity recognition process. CSE is recognizing the 
need for increased analysis of inventions and innovations received as potential projects, 
and being able to apply a licensing component in the commercialization of such projects. 
As indicated in Figure 6, the open exchange model of building recognition capital can be 
extended to include entrepreneurial value creation in establishment of networks, 
collaborations, relationships, and ventures. This includes the recognition of new types of 
roles, developed within the university and then transferred outside the universities: the 
academic entrepreneur, evolving from the university scientist or researcher actively 
engaging in the formation of innovation through licensing and technology development; 
the start-up entrepreneur, evolving from the student educated in not only the theory of 
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entrepreneurial activity, but now actively partaking in venture creation and licensing of 
new ideas while within the realm of the university; and the institutional entrepreneur, 
evolving from the consultative or otherwise administrative actor that has the ability to 
facilitate opportunity recognition activities, learning and guiding the other two 
entrepreneurial roles through the process33.  We propose this entrepreneurial recognition 
capital model combined with the object-oriented licensing-based step-by-step model 
introduced as an image of what a new university infrastructure for commercializing new 
knowledge could comprise (see Figure 7). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. The proposed model of a new infrastructure for commercializing knowledge by 
combining a step-by-step object-oriented approach with the building of entrepreneurial 
recognition capital. 
 
Implications and discussion 
Both case examples can be seen as pioneering efforts in the area of university 
commercialization. Both cases now face a much broader inclusion of all relevant actors in 
learning processes – professors, students, business people and policy makers. When this 
                                                
33 Lundqvist, M.A., 2004. Entrepreneurial roles in the university, paper presented at the CIP 
symposium on “The Entrepreneurial University”, June 1-3, in Gothenburg. 
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happens, university management is likely to confront a need of change in leadership 
style, from a more reactive governance of open exchange and nurturing diversity, to a 
more proactive, prioritizing and strategic leadership. Central to this change is finding 
ways to develop such a leadership, without compromising open exchange, and critical as 
well as “blue sky” research. Most likely, university managers will depend on integrative 
activity with both government policy-makers as well as on an increased maturity and 
willingness to flexibly manage the new complex landscape – including critical research, 
contract research, collaborations, licensing and venture creation – among researchers and 
research groups. This change-challenge is likely a global concern, and governments and 
universities need to find ways of supporting step-by-step change, recognizing specific 
starting points of universities (see Figure 3). The two case illustrations have shown two 
paths of change towards seemingly converging ambitions. There are most likely other 
paths as well. However, research, university management and policy-makers needs to 
discuss 1) how a new infrastructure for commercializing can be conceptualized and 2) 
what different paths to reach such an infrastructure are required in terms of coordinated 
policy-practice-theory interaction.  
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